The Limits of Identity: Running Tuvel’s Argument the Other Way
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Received: 29 May 2022 / Revised: 23 Oct 2022 / Accepted: 7 Oct 2022 / Published: 31 Oct 2022
Abstract
Rebecca Tuvel provoked a firestorm by arguing that since we should accept trans* self-identification, we should accept transracial identification as well. This paper defends Tuvel’s conditional claim (if trans* acceptance, then transracial acceptance) but draws a different conclusion. I argue that reasoning similar to Tuvel’s establishes that people who identify as something other than human, and people who identify as physically disabled though their bodies aren’t impaired, plausibly also deserve recognition. This reductio ad absurdum of her reasoning should lead us to doubt whether we must embrace trans* self-identification as fully as self-described trans* allies claim that we must. This shouldn’t be construed to mean that trans* people, or members of any of these other groups, deserve anything less than respectful treatment and compassion as moral persons.
Keywords: transgender; trans*; gender; gender identity; Tuvel; Hypatia; transracial; identity; otherkin; trans-ability
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This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
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provided the original work is properly cited. (CC BY 4.0).
CITE
Whittaker (pseudonym), K. The Limits of Identity: Running Tuvel’s Argument the Other Way. Controversial_Ideas 2022, 2, 5.
Whittaker (pseudonym) K. The Limits of Identity: Running Tuvel’s Argument the Other Way. Journal of Controversial Ideas. 2022; 2(2):5.
Whittaker (pseudonym), K. 2022. "The Limits of Identity: Running Tuvel’s Argument the Other Way." Controversial_Ideas 2, no. 2: 5.
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